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Research shows that people can intentionally forget previously learned
information when instructed to do so – known as the directed forgetting effect (for a
review, see MacLeod 1998). The current experiments investigated intentional forgetting
of self-relevant information presented in the form of political attitude statements.
Groups of Republicans and Democrats participated in two list-method directed forgetting
studies, during which they studied a mixture of statements that expressed representative
views of these parties. Experiment 1 results revealed that both Republicans and
Democrats showed directed forgetting of statements expressing the views of the opposing
political party, but showed no directed forgetting of statements expressing the views of
their own party. In Experiment 2, participants studied the same statements and also rated
them for agreement level. The results confirmed that regardless of the party affiliation,
there was no directed forgetting of statements that participants agreed with; however
there was directed forgetting of statements with which they disagreed or felt neutral
about. Attitudes that people agree with are integrated in memory as an intrinsic part of the
self concept, this integration, in turn, acts to prevent directed forgetting of this type of
information.
CAN YOU FORGET WHAT YOU BELIEVE? DIRECTED FORGETTING OF
ATTITUDE INFORMATION
by 
 
Emily Rose Waldum
A Thesis Submitted to
The Faculty of the Graduate School at
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
Greensboro
2007
Approved by
____________________
Committee Chair
ii
APPROVAL PAGE
This thesis has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty of The
Graduate School at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro.
Committee Chair__________________________________________
Committee Members_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________
___________________________
Date of Acceptance by Committee
___________________________
Date of Final Oral Examination
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES ……………………………………………………………………….iv
LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………………………….………v
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………...…...…..….1
II. EXPERIMENT 1 METHODS……...……………………………......….……..10
III. EXPERIMENT 1 RESULTS………………………………………...………...14
IV. EXPERIMENT 2 METHODS……………………………………...………….20
V. EXPERIMENT 2 RESULTS…………………….………………...……..……22
VI. GENERAL DISCUSSION……………………..………………...……….…...30
REFERENCES…………………………………….……...………………………….….40
iv
LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 1. Proportion of List 1 Recall by Agreement Ratings
in Experiment 2 ….............................................................................................31
v
LIST OF FIGURES
Page
Figure 1. Proportion of List 1 Recall by Attitude Statements, Cue, and Party
in Experiment 1……………………………………………………...……….15
Figure 2. Proportion of List 1 Recall by Cue and Attitude Statements
in Experiment 1……………………………....................................................16
Figure 3. Proportion of List 2 Recall by Attitude Statements, Cue, and Party
in Experiment 1………………………… ……………………………....…...18
Figure 4. Proportion of List 1 Recall by Attitude Statements, Cue, and Party
in Experiment 2..………………………..………............................................24
Figure 5. Proportion of List 1 Recall by Cue and Attitude Statements
in Experiment 2………………………………………………………………25
Figure 6. Proportion of List 1 Recall by Cue and Agreement
in Experiment 2………………………….…………………………………...27
Figure 7. Proportion of List 2 Recall by Attitude Statements, Cue, and Party
in Experiment 2………………………….………...........................................28
1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Situations often arise in everyday life where for various reasons we want to
willingly forget certain information. This paper is about deliberate forgetting of
politically relevant attitude statements. While at first it may not be immediately obvious
why anyone would want to forget political attitude information, consider the following
scenario:
Imagine that you are following a candidate who you think has been impressive in
a current campaign. You have listened to this person speak, and are well-informed about
this individual’s views on important political issues. Unfortunately, later you learn of a
scandal that this person was involved in, and you decide that you no longer want to vote
for this candidate. Furthermore, you feel that you should forget all the information you
have learned about this candidate not only because it is no longer relevant, but also
because it could help you better learn about the views of the other candidates. In
situations like this, forgetting or inhibiting unwanted information could serve an adaptive
role because it could allow for the formation of more accurate impressions about other
candidates. In the lab, a technique that is often used to capture the mechanisms of
intentional forgetting is known as the directed forgetting procedure, invented by Bjork,
LaBerge, and LeGrand (1968)
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During directed forgetting studies, people are presented information to learn for a
later memory test. Participants are instructed to forget certain items following study and
are asked to remember other items. Instructions to forget or remember can be delivered
either on an item-by-item basis or after an entire block of items has been presented
(known as the item-method and the list-method of directed forgetting, respectively). The
current research utilizes the list-method, and therefore, it is discussed in greater detail.
In the list method, two lists of items are presented to participants to study for a
later memory test. Following presentation of the first list, participants are given a cue to
either forget or to remember all List 1 items. Participants receiving the forget instruction
are informed that the first list was presented simply “as practice,” and that there is no
need to remember them. Participants receiving the remember instruction are informed
that the items presented on List 1 were only the first half of the items and that they should
remember for a later test. Then all participants study the second list of items, after which
they are asked to recall items from both lists. The typical directed forgetting effect
consists of two components, known as the costs and benefits. The costs of directed
forgetting refer to the impaired recall of List 1 items by the forget group compared to the
remember group; the benefits of directed forgetting refer to the increased recall of List 2
items by the forget group compared to the remember group.
Theoretical Mechanisms of Directed Forgetting
There are currently several accounts of the directed forgetting effect which can be
grouped as single-process theories versus dual-process theories. The former explain both
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the costs and benefits of directed forgetting using a single mechanism, whereas the latter
uses different processes to account for the costs and the benefits of directed forgetting.
The first single-process account, known as the selective rehearsal hypothesis, was
proposed by Bjork (1970, 1972). He argued that in response to a forget instruction
participants cease all rehearsal and mnemonic strategies that they used to remember List
1 items and instead devote these strategies entirely to List 2 items. According to this
theory, the costs of directed forgetting arise as a result of terminating List 1 rehearsal
following the forget cue. List 1 rehearsal termination in the forget group can also explain
the benefits of directed forgetting. Because participants in the forget group no longer
need to rehearse List 1 items, all rehearsal can be directed toward List 2 items.
Remember group participants, on the other hand, must rehearse both List 1 and List 2
items. The inefficient List 2 rehearsal by the remember group participants can lead to
poorer List 2 recall in this group compared to the forget group, giving rise to the benefits
of directed forgetting.
Several findings have posed a challenge for the selective rehearsal theory. For
example, Geiselman, Bjork, and Fishman (1983) as well as Sahakyan and Delaney (2005)
have demonstrated that both intentionally and incidentally learned list items produced
directed forgetting effects. According to the selective rehearsal account, incidental items
should not have produced directed forgetting effects, because they were not to be
remembered, and therefore, were less likely to be rehearsed by the participants. The
intentional items, on the other hand, were probably rehearsed and therefore should have
been the only items to suffer from the termination of rehearsal following the forget cue
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Another reliable finding that is problematic for the selective rehearsal account is
the absence of directed forgetting costs on recognition tests (e.g., Basden, Basden, &
Gargano, 1993; Benjamin, 2006; Bjork & Bjork, 1996; Block, 1971; Elmes, Adams &
Roediger, 1970; Geiselman et al., 1983; Sahakyan & Delaney, 2005). If selective
rehearsal led to an encoding disadvantage of forget items compared to the remember
items, such deficits in encoding should have been evident on recognition tests as well as
recall tests; however, researchers have not observed such an effect.
These inconsistencies led R.A. Bjork (1989) to propose a new mechanism of
directed forgetting, which emphasizes retrieval processes over encoding differences –
called, a retrieval inhibition hypothesis. The retrieval inhibition account suggests that the
forget instruction initiates a process that at the time of retrieval inhibits or blocks access
to List 1 items, producing the costs. The benefits are explained by differences in the
amount of proactive interference that accrues on List 2 items in the forget and remember
groups. Because List 1 items are inhibited in the forget group, they produce less proactive
interference on List 2. Consequently, the forget group is able to recall more List 2 items
than can the remember group, leading to the benefits of directed forgetting
Recently, a dual-process account has been proposed that attributes the costs and
the benefits to the operation of two different mechanisms (Sahakyan & Delaney, 2005).
The first component of the dual-process account relies on Sahakyan and Kelley’s (2002)
mental context change mechanism to explain the costs of directed forgetting. The second
component utilizes the strategy-change mechanism of Sahakyan and Delaney (2003) to
account for the benefits of directed forgetting. According to the context hypothesis, the
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costs of directed forgetting arise because participants attempt to actively change mental
context when given a forget cue (Sahakyan & Kelley, 2002). As a result, the context
present at the time of the final test better matches the learning context that was present
during List 2 encoding than List 1 encoding, leading to forgetting of List 1 items.
Empirical evidence for this theory was shown by demonstrating that in the absence of a
forget cue, a deliberate context change between the lists induced by engaging people in a
diversionary thought, produces the same effects as those normally demonstrated in the
forget group. Additionally, reinstating the original List 1 context at retrieval reduced the
costs and the benefits of directed forgetting (Sahakyan & Kelley, 2002).
According to the strategy change mechanism of Sahakyan and Delaney (2003),
the benefits of directed forgetting arise because participants in the forget condition are
more likely to switch to a more efficient encoding strategy between Lists 1 and List 2
than are participants in a remember condition. The initial evidence for this idea came
from verbal reports which revealed that although many participants switched from a
shallow encoding strategy on List 1 to a deeper encoding strategy on List 2, participants
in the forget group switched to a deeper encoding more frequently than did remember
group participants. Furthermore, when participants were not allowed to switch strategy
between List 1 and List 2 and instead were required to use the same encoding strategy on
both lists, no benefits emerged (Sahakyan & Delaney, 2003). Likewise, when all
participants were required to switch from a shallow to a deeper encoding strategy
between the two lists, there were no relative benefits for the forget group, because the
remember group also benefited from strategy change. Taken together, these findings
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support the idea that directed forgetting benefits arise from encoding differences between
the forget and remember groups. 
Rationale for Current Studies
The directed forgetting effect has been investigated with unrelated words (for
reviews see Bjork, Bjork, & Anderson, 1998; MacLeod, 1998), emotional words (e.g.,
Power, Dalgleish, Claudio, Tata & Kentish, 2000; Wessel & Merckelbach, 2006),
pictures (e.g., Basden & Basden, 1996; Lehman, McKinley-Pace, Leonard, Thompson &
Johns, 2001), and prose sentences (e.g., Geiselman, 1977a, 1977b). However, there has
been limited research exploring the ability to intentionally forget complex attitude
information. To date, two studies have investigated directed forgetting using lists of
stereotypic trait words (Araya, Akrami, & Ekehammar, 2003; Macrae, Bodenhausen,
Milne, & Ford, 1997). However, the manipulation of attitude information in these studies
was rather weak, as it involved the use of trait words that were supposed to reflect a
specific social category (e.g. Swedish people, immigrants, child abusers). In both studies,
the relevant social category was primed prior to list learning. Macrae et al. (1997)
primed the social category “child abuser” by having participants read a newspaper article
concerning an incident of child abuse prior to list learning; this task was framed as
unrelated to the list learning task that followed. Araya et al. (2003) used subliminal facial
priming by showing masked presentations of stereotypical Swedish and immigrant faces
prior to list learning. In both experiments, following the priming task, lists of trait words
were presented as the study stimuli, and both studies reported significant directed
forgetting costs. However, it remains unclear whether participants associated the studied
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trait words with the primed social category or were aware of the relationship between
them. Furthermore, no manipulation checks were used to determine if the participants
actually held the relevant stereotypic beliefs. While these studies found significant costs
of directed forgetting for stereotypic trait words, there are reasons to suspect that more
complex attitudinal information, presented in the form of statements, may reduce or
prevent directed forgetting.
Because attitudinal information is a well-integrated part of the self-concept, its
presentation is likely to elicit self-referential encoding. Self-referential encoding produces
strong memory representations and enhances memory partly because it promotes
elaborative and organizational processing (e.g., Klein & Loftus, 1988). For example,
participants might elaborate on the presented attitude information by actively linking it
with other extra-list counter-arguments and personal experiences already present in
memory (Eagly, Kulsea, & Brannon, 2000). They might also organize the presented
material by grouping it into categories, such as “things that describe me” versus “things
that do not describe me” (Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986). Elaborative and organizational
processing are both said to improve memory because they create multiple routes for
retrieval (e.g., Hunt & Einstein, 1981; Hunt & McDaniel, 1993).
The strong retrieval cues established in response to encoding attitude information
may be resilient to directed forgetting, because they might be used at retrieval to reduce
or eliminate the costs of directed forgetting. For example, it is known that participants
tend to spontaneously reinstate self-reference conditions at retrieval (Wells, Hoffman, &
Enzle, 1984). If directed forgetting arises from changes in mental context between the
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study episodes, then attitude information may be resistant to contextual change because at
the time of test, self-related cues can be reinstated and overcome the effects of contextual
disruption. It is known that reinstating the initial study context at the time of final test
reduces the directed forgetting costs (Sahakyan & Kelley, 2002). Therefore, if
participants spontaneously reinstate self-reference conditions at the time of test, we might
observe a reduced or null directed forgetting effect with attitudinal statements.
The current studies utilized the list-method directed forgetting design using
political attitude statements as the study materials. The choice of stimuli was partly
motivated by the prominence of the selected issues in everyday life, and because people
typically hold pre-existing beliefs and attitudes regarding them. The use of political
stimuli enabled us to identify and recruit two distinct groups with divergent viewpoints
on the selected issues (Republicans vs. Democrats), and to manipulate the study material
to be either congruent or incongruent with their existing beliefs. In Experiment 1,
liberally and conservatively phrased political attitude statements concerning a variety of
issues were presented to Democrat and Republican participants in a list-method directed
forgetting paradigm. Experiment 1 was conducted primarily as an exploratory study, as
the main purpose was to observe whether or not typical directed forgetting effects would
emerge with complex, self-relevant attitude information. We thought it possible that
congruent attitude information may be more resilient to directed forgetting than
incongruent attitude information, because congruent attitude information may be more
likely to elicit strong self-referential processing than incongruent attitude information.
Information with which one agrees may be a more integrated part of the self-concept than
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information with which one disagrees. Therefore, the presentation of congruent attitude
information may lead to the establishment of many strong, self-relevant retrieval cues
that could lead to the elimination or attenuation of the costs of directed forgetting.
Incongruent attitude information, on the other hand, may be more susceptible to a
directed forgetting cue if this type of information elicits less self-referential processing.
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CHAPTER II
EXPERIMENT 1 METHODS
Participants
The participants were 64 University of North Carolina at Greensboro
undergraduate students who participated for course credit. Prior to testing, half of the
participants identified themselves as Republicans, and half identified themselves as
Democrats. They were tested in small groups of no more than 5 participants at a time.
Materials
A pool of statements reflecting political attitudes was developed according to the
following procedure. A group of 44 undergraduate psychology students was assigned 4 of
16 pre-selected political issues (e.g., abortion, global warming) and asked to write two
statements regarding each of the 4 issues. They were instructed to write one statement
that they thought was representative of a typical Republican viewpoint regarding each
issue and one statement that they believed was reflective of a typical Democratic
viewpoint regarding the same issue. Responses regarding all 16 issues were collected,
and the experimenters selected one representative Republican statement and one
representative Democratic statement for each of the 16 issues. Thus, there were 16
liberally phrased statements, and 16 conservatively phrased statements that comprised the
pool of stimuli.
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To further ensure that the statements would be perceived as representative of the two
political ideologies, pre-testing was conducted. Seventy-eight undergraduate psychology
students who had no prior familiarity with the items were asked to rate one version of
each statement. Therefore, 16 statements (8 Republican and 8 Democratic) were rated by
half of the participants, whereas the opposing versions of those statements were rated by
the remaining participants. Each participant rated the 16 statements based on how
representative they felt each was of a Republican or a Democratic viewpoint. They were
asked to use a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 reflected the most characteristic Democratic
viewpoint, and 7 reflected the most characteristic Republican viewpoint. Pre-testing
results confirmed that students perceived the Republican and Democratically phrased
statements as representative of typical party ideologies; they rated Republican statements
significantly higher (5.4) than they rated Democratic statements (3.0), t(78)=15.18,
p<.001. Therefore, the final pool of items consisted of the same 32 statement used in pre-
testing.
From the final pool of 16 topics, experimenters created two lists (A and B), each
containing four liberal and four conservative statements. Two additional lists (C and D)
were created that contained the same 16 topics as Lists A and B, but the statements were
phrased in the opposite way. For example, a liberally-phrased statement on List A was
phrased in a conservative way on List C (and vice versa). Each participant studied two
lists (either A and B, or C and D). The order of the lists was counterbalanced. Thus, each
person studied 4 conservative and 4 liberal statements in each study list.
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Design
This study employed a mixed factorial design, with Cue (forget vs. remember)
and Party Affiliation (Republican vs. Democrat) as the between subjects factors, and
Attitude Statements (congruent vs. incongruent) as the within subjects factor. When the
party affiliation of the participants coincided with the phrasing of the statements that they
studied, we termed this condition congruent (i.e., conservative statements studied by
Republicans and liberal statements studied by Democrats); whenever they were opposite,
we termed this condition incongruent (i.e., liberal statements studied by Republicans, and
conservative statements studied by Democrats).
Procedure
The procedure followed the list method of directed forgetting. Prior to list
presentation, participants were informed that they should read and memorize the
presented statements. During encoding, participants were instructed to rate each
statement, on a scale of 1 to 7, according to how conservatively or liberally they thought
each statement was phrased. Participants were informed that a rating of 1 should be
given to those statements that they thought represented the most liberal attitudes, and a
rating of 7 was to be given to those statements that they considered most representative of
conservative attitudes.
All statements were presented on a computer screen at a rate of 10 s per
statement. List 1 presentation was followed by either a forget or a remember cue, which
was verbally presented by the experimenter. Participants receiving the forget cue were
informed that List 1 presentation was “just for practice,” and was presented in order to
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familiarize them with the task. They were told to try and forget those statements because
they would not be tested. The remember cue specified that the statements presented on
List 1 were just the first half of items that were to be remembered for a later memory test.
Following the mid-list cue, all participants were presented with a second list of
statements. After studying List 2, participants were first given 3 minutes to recall List 1
statements, and an additional 3 minutes to recall List 2 statements. Recall was carried out
on separate sheets of paper, and participants were informed that they could paraphrase the
statements.
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CHAPTER III
EXPERIMENT 1 RESULTS
A statement was scored as correct only if the participant both successfully
recalled the main topic of the statement (e.g. abortion) and made some indication of
whether the statement had been presented as liberally or conservatively phrased. For
example, for the presented statement “Abortion of an unborn child is murder,” the
recalled phrase “abortion is wrong” would have been an acceptable response, whereas
“abortion” would not count toward correct recall.
The number of statements that were switched during recall (e.g., liberally
presented statements recalled with conservative phrasing, or conservatively presented
statements recalled with liberal phrasing) was also recorded. Overall, the mean
proportion of confusions during recall was very low (.02 on List 1 and .01 on List 2).
Directed Forgetting Costs. To examine the effect of attitude congruency on
directed forgetting, a mixed-factorial ANOVA was conducted on proportion of correct
List 1 recall using cue (forget vs. remember), party (Democrat vs. Republican), and
attitude statements (congruent vs. incongruent). The results are displayed in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Proportion of List 1 Recall by Attitude Statements, Cue, and Party in
Experiment 1. Error bars represent SE.
No significant main effects were found (Cue, F(1,60)=1.29, p=.26; Party, F<1; Attitude
Statements, F<1). However, a significant attitude statements by cue interaction was
identified, F(1,60)=7.78, MSE=.049, p<.01, ή2 =.12 . Follow-up tests indicated that
participants in the forget condition recalled significantly fewer incongruent statements
(.34) than participants in the remember group (.53), t(32)=2.76 p<.01. However, there
was no significant difference in recall of congruent statements between the remember
group (.38) and the forget group (.43), t<1. In other words, incongruent statements
showed the costs of directed forgetting, whereas the congruent statements did not (See
Figure 2). Furthermore, this pattern of forgetting emerged for both Republicans and
Democrats, as there was no significant 3-way interaction (F < 1). None of the remaining
two-way interactions were significant (all F’s <1). To summarize, Democrats forgot
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conservatively phrased statements, and Republicans forgot liberally phrased statements,
but they did not forget the statements that expressed the views of their own party.
Figure 2. Proportion of List 1 Recall by Cue and Attitude Statements in Experiment 1.
Error bars represent SE
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Directed Forgetting Benefits. While the costs of directed forgetting were of
principal interest in this study, we also examined the directed forgetting benefits using
similar analyses. The results are summarized in Figure 3. A mixed-factorial ANOVA on
proportion of List 2 recall by cue (forget vs. remember), attitude statements (congruent
vs. incongruent) and party (Republican vs. Democrat) revealed no significant main
effects (all F’s<1). Furthermore, no 2-way interactions were significant (Party x Cue:
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F<1; Attitude Statements x Cue: F(1,60)=1.04, p=.31; Attitude Statements x Party:
F(1,60)=1.94, p=.17. However, a significant 3-way interaction was observed,
F(1,60)=4.55, MSE=.057, p<.05, ή2 =.07.
To follow-up this interaction, separate analyses were conducted on congruent and
incongruent attitude statements using cue (forget vs. remember) and party (Democrat vs.
Republican). For congruent statements, there were neither significant main effects
(F’s<1), nor an interaction, F(1,63)=1.42, p=.24. In other words, there were no directed
forgetting benefits for congruent attitude statements. For incongruent statements, there
were also no significant main effects (Cue: F(1, 63)=1.28, p=.26; Party: F(1,63)=1.92,
p=.17). The cue by party interaction approached but did not reach significance,
F(1,63)=2.68, p=.11. Although the interaction was not significant, we nonetheless
conducted follow-up tests to better explore the results. Additional analyses revealed that
on incongruent statements, Democrats showed no directed forgetting benefits, t<1 (.53 in
Remember and .56 in Forget), but the Republicans actually showed significant anti-
benefits, t(16)=2.07, p<.05, with better List 2 recall in the remember condition than in the
forget condition. Overall, the analyses revealed no significant directed forgetting benefits
either on congruent or incongruent statements; surprisingly, Republicans showed
significant anti-benefits on List 2 incongruent statements.
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Figure 3. Proportion of List 2 Recall by Attitude Statements, Cue, and Party in
Experiment 1. Error bars represent SE
Summary. The directed forgetting costs were observed only on incongruent
attitude statements, but not on congruent attitude statements, and this was true both in the
Republican and the Democrat participants’ recall. In other words, participants were
unable to intentionally forget statements that expressed the views of their own party, but
were able to forget statements that expressed the views of the opposing party.
Additionally, no significant directed forgetting benefits were found on either type of
statement; quite unexpectedly, the Republican participants displayed significant anti-
benefits of List 2 incongruent statements.
If we assume that in general participants agreed with congruent statements and
disagreed with incongruent statements, then the directed forgetting costs results imply
that agreement might moderate one’s ability to intentionally forget information. In the
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current study, participants were unable to intentionally forget congruent statements that
expressed the views of their own party, presumably because they were more likely to
endorse those views compared to views expressed in incongruent statements. However,
because no agreement ratings were collected in Experiment 1, it remains to be seen how
the congruent/incongruent categorization of attitude statements reflects the degree to
which participants actually endorse those views, and how the level of endorsement
affects directed forgetting. This was addressed in Experiment 2.
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CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENT 2 METHODS
In Experiment 2 we required participants to rate each statement in terms of how
much they endorsed the views expressed in it. This change was made to allow for a more
detailed exploration of a possible mediating effect of attitude endorsement on directed
forgetting, and to take into account any variability in the degree of agreement within the
congruent and incongruent statements. In all other respects, the study was identical to
Experiment 1.
Participants
The participants were 85 University of North Carolina at Greensboro
undergraduate students who participated for course credit. Prior to testing, 41 of the
participants identified themselves as Republicans, and 44 identified themselves as
Democrats. They were tested in small groups of no more than 5 participants at a time.
Materials
The materials used in the current study were the same as those used in Experiment
1. The Mehrabian(1996) Liberalism-Conservatism scale was also used in this experiment
as an independent measure of political party affiliation. This is a seven item scale that is
comprised of items such as, “I am politically more liberal than conservative”. Participants
are required to provide a rating of +4 (very strong agreement) to -4 (very strong
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disagreement) for each item. Highly positive scores on this scale represent strong
conservatism, and large negative scores reflect liberalism. Scores on this scale can range
from -28 to +28.
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1, except for
two small changes. Participants were asked to rate each statement for
agreement/disagreement rather than for liberalism/conservatism, using a scale from 1 to
7, where 1 represents strong agreement, and 7 represents strong disagreement. Also,
participants completed the Mehrabian (1996) Liberalism-Conservatism following List 2
recall.
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CHAPTER V
EXPERIMENT 2 RESULTS
On average, the scores on the Mehrabian (1996) Liberalism-Conservatism scale
validated participants’ self reports of political party affiliation. The scores obtained from
self-reported Democrats (M= -6.24, SD=7.12) were significantly lower than the scores
obtained from self-reported Republicans (M=9.71, SD=7.71), t(81)=9.79, p<.001. Two
scale scores were missing from this analysis, as two participants did not complete the
scale due to experimenter error. Although for most participants the scale scores validated
their self-reports, ten participants received scores on the scale that did not correspond
with their self-reported political party (i.e., some self-reported Democrats scored in the
Republican range of the scale and vice versa.). Because of these contradictory scores,
political party in all reported analyses was defined by the Liberalism-Conservatism scale
scores rather than self-reports. The former is likely to be a more sensitive measure as it
consists of several questions that inquire about party affiliation as opposed to self-reports,
which could be influenced by demand characteristics of the experiment. The two
participants who did not complete the scale due to experimenter error were excluded
from the analyses.
The number of statements that were switched during recall (i.e., liberally
presented statements recalled with conservative phrasing, or conservatively presented
statements recalled with liberal phrasing) was again recorded in Experiment 2. As in
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Experiment 1, the mean proportion of switches was very low both on List 1 (.04) and on
List 2 (.03).
Participants’ average agreement ratings were also analyzed to determine how well
they mapped onto the incongruent/congruent distinction of statements. On the scale from
1 to 7, ratings higher than 4 indicated disagreement, whereas ratings lower than 4
indicated agreement. Overall, participants rated congruent statements significantly lower
(3.33) than incongruent statements (4.13), t(83)=4.15, p<.001, confirming that they
tended to agree more with congruent statements, and disagree more often with
incongruent statements.
Directed Forgetting Costs. To analyze the directed forgetting costs, a mixed
factorial ANOVA was conducted on proportion of correct List 1 recall using cue (forget
vs. remember), party affiliation (Republican vs. Democrat), and attitude statements
(congruent vs. incongruent). The results are summarized in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Proportion of List 1 Recall by Attitude Statements, Cue, and Party in
Experiment 2. Error bars represent SE
Only a significant main effect of cue emerged, F(1,79)=5.32, MSE=.090, p<.05, ή2=.06
(.50 in Remember and .40 in Forget). None of the remaining main effects or interactions
was significant (Party Affiliation x Cue, F(1,79)=1.23, p=.27; all other F’s<1). Most
surprisingly, counter to what was observed in Experiment 1, the cue by attitude
statements interaction was not significant, F<1, which indicates that participants showed
equivalent forgetting of both congruent and incongruent statements (see Figure 5).
List 1 Recall by Democrats
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
congruent incongruent
Attitude Statements
P
ro
po
rt
io
n
Li
st
1
R
ec
al
l
Forget Remember
List 1 Recall by Republicans
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
congruent incongruent
Attitude Statements
P
ro
p
or
tio
n
Li
st
1
R
ec
al
l
Forget Remember
25
Figure 5. Proportion of List 1 Recall by Cue and Attitude Statements in Experiment 2.
Error bars represent SE.
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Directed Forgetting Costs by Agreement Ratings. List 1 recall was also analyzed
as a function of participants’ degree of agreement with the attitude statements. The
statements were grouped into three broad categories – agree, neutral, and disagree. Any
statement receiving a rating of 1 or 2 was classified as an agree statement, statements
rated as 3, 4, or 5 were classified as neutral, and statements rated as 6 or 7 were labeled
as disagree. Separate agree, neutral, and disagree statement recall proportions were
calculated by dividing the number of each type of statement recalled at test by the total
number of the corresponding statement type rated during study. For example, if a
participant rated two of the eight List 1 statements as disagree statements, and recalled
only one of the disagree statements at recall, the proportion of disagree statement recall
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would be ½ or .50. Separate analyses were conducted using these agree, disagree, and
neutral recall proportions to determine the magnitude of directed forgetting costs for each
type of statement.
The results showed that there were significant directed forgetting costs on
disagree statements, with the forget group recalling significantly fewer disagree
statements from List 1 (.39) than the remember group (.61), t(67)=2.24, p<.05. Similarly,
analyses on neutral statements also revealed significant directed forgetting costs, with the
forget group recalling fewer neutral statements (.31) than the remember group (.47),
t(80)=2.36, p<.05. In contrast, recall of agree statements in the remember condition (.50)
did not differ significantly from the forget condition (.51), t<1, revealing no directed
forgetting costs for the agree statements. To summarize, when participants agreed with
the views reflected in the statements they studied, they were unable to intentionally forget
them; however, if they disagreed or felt neutral about them, they were able to deliberately
forget them (see Figure 6). Therefore, the degree of attitude endorsement moderated the
ability to intentionally forget information. Although we only report results from the
analyses where statements were grouped as agree (1-2), neutral (3—5), and disagree (6-
7), we also examined results through alternative ways of grouping the statements into the
three categories, including examining only extreme ratings (i.e., agree (1), neutral (4),
and disagree (7)). Regardless of the grouping method, the basic pattern of findings was
obtained in all analyses – there was no forgetting of statements that participants agreed
with, but there was directed forgetting of disagree and neutral statements.
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Figure 6. Proportion of List 1 Recall by Cue and Agreement in Experiment 2. Error bars
represent SE.
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Directed Forgetting Benefits. To evaluate the benefits of directed forgetting, a
mixed-factorial ANOVA was conducted on proportion of correct List 2 recall using cue
(forget vs. remember), party (Republican vs. Democrat), and attitude statements
(congruent vs. incongruent). The results are summarized in Figure 7. No main effects
were identified (Cue, F(1,79)=1.45, p=.23; Party: F<1; Attitude Statements, F<1). There
were also no significant 2-way interactions (Cue x Party Affiliation, F(1,79)=1.90, p=.17,
all other F’s<1). Likewise, there was no significant 3-way interaction, F(1,79)=2.36,
p=.13.
Given that the 3-way interaction was approaching significance, we further
explored the results. Overall, the follow-ups revealed that there were significant directed
forgetting anti-benefits in the Republican group on the congruent statements, t(42)=2.71,
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p<.05, but not on incongruent statements, t<1. On the other hand, in the Democrat group,
the directed forgetting benefits were absent both on congruent statements and on
incongruent statements, both t’s<1.
Figure 7. Proportion of List 2 Recall by Attitude Statements, Cue, and Party in
Experiment 2. Error bars represent SE
Directed Forgetting Benefits by Agreement Ratings. List 2 recall was also
analyzed as a function of participants’ degree of agreement with the attitude statements.
There were no significant List 2 recall differences for the agree statements t<1 (.49 in
Forget and .57 in Remember). There were also no significant differences in List 2
disagree statement recall, t<1 (.37 in Forget and .46 in Remember). Finally, there were no
significant differences in List 2 recall of neutral statements t(80)=1.57, p=.12 (.40 in
Forget and .50 in Remember).
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Summary. Significant costs of directed forgetting were observed for both
incongruent as well as congruent statements. This means that participants were able to
intentionally forget statements that expressed the views of their own party as well as
statements that expressed the views of the opposing party. When statements were further
broken down into those participants agreed, disagreed, or felt neutral about, only the
disagree and neutral statements produced significant directed forgetting costs; statements
with which participants agreed were not successfully forgotten.
The results of the benefits analyses revealed no typical directed forgetting benefits
either on congruent or incongruent statements. The benefits were also absent when recall
was analyzed by degree of agreement. However, Republicans showed significant anti-
benefits for congruent statements
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CHAPTER VI
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Two list-method directed forgetting studies were conducted using political
attitude statements to determine whether attitude congruency and level of agreement
affect one’s ability to intentionally forget information. In Experiment 1, participants
were able to successfully forget information that expressed views which were
incongruent with their own political party (i.e., Democrats were able to forget
conservatively phrased statements, and Republicans were able to forget liberally phrased
statements). However, they were unable to forget statements that were congruent with
the views associated with their own political party. Experiment 2 was identical to
Experiment 1, except that participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement or
disagreement with each statement. Contrary to what was observed in Experiment 1,
participants showed significant forgetting of congruent as well as incongruent statements
in Experiment 2. However, when recall was further analyzed by the degree of agreement,
some interesting findings emerged. Specifically, participants were unable to forget
statements with which they agreed, but were able to forget statements they felt neutral
about as well as statements they disagreed with.
There was an interesting discrepancy in findings between the two experiments –
specifically, congruent statements were not forgotten in Experiment 1, but the same
congruent statements showed significant directed forgetting in Experiment 2. The only
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difference between these two experiments was the orienting task that was used
during presentation of statements. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to rate each
statement for how liberally or conservatively they thought each statement was phrased.
However, in Experiment 2, they rated each statement for the level of agreement or
disagreement.
It is possible that the conservative/liberal judgments used in Experiment 1 led to
strong priming of party affiliation, which in turn led to more extreme feelings of
agreement or disagreement in that experiment. For example, participants may have felt
more obligated to agree or disagree along party lines when political party affiliation was
made salient in Experiment 1. In other words, the orienting task could have biased
participants’ true feelings of agreement or disagreement in Experiment 1. In contrast, in
Experiment 2, the orienting task did not emphasize political party, and participants’
ratings of agreement or disagreement may have more accurately reflected their own
endorsement of those views. Note that in Experiment 2, nearly one half of the congruent
and incongruent statements were rated neutrally (See Table 1).
Table 1. Proportion of List 1 Recall by Agreement Ratings in Experiment 2
List 1 Statements Agree Neutral Disagree
Congruent 37.0% 49.8% 13.2%
Incongruent 21.1% 46.7% 32.2%
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Therefore, it is possible that in Experiment 1, the party priming from the orienting task
may have led to a larger proportion of congruent statements being perceived as “agree”
statements than what was observed in Experiment 2. If more of the congruent statements
were perceived as “agree” statements in Experiment 1, this could explain why they were
unforgettable in that experiment; specifically because “agree” statements were shown to
be immune to directed forgetting in Experiment 2.
Mechanisms by which Agreement Moderates Directed Forgetting Costs
Previous research shows that the degree of attitude endorsement also moderates
other forgetting phenomena such as retrieval-induced forgetting (Dunn & Spellman,
2003). They found that the more participants endorsed certain stereotypes, the less
retrieval-induced forgetting of stereotypic information they displayed. Dunn and
Spellman argue that participants’ high level of endorsement of relevant stereotypes serves
to integrate stereotypic information, thereby preventing forgetting. The findings of the
current studies suggest that agreement is also an important variable that moderates the
ability to deliberately forget certain information. Specifically, information with which
participants agree becomes immune to directed forgetting, and an important question is
why this happens.
Attitude information with which one agrees may be more integrated in memory as
part of the self-concept than more neutral information, or information with which one
disagrees (Dunn & Spellman, 2003). It is reasonable to assume that attitude information
contained in the self-concept may most often take the form of information a person
agrees with, because people tend to review or summarize their own beliefs in terms of
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agreement. For instance, it is more likely that a person might say “I am against the Iraq
War,” and “I am pro-choice,” than “I disagree that the Iraq war is justified,” or “I
disagree with people who are pro-life.” While these statements do reflect the same
views, the statements that are phrased in terms of the person’s agreement may be more
integrated with each other as part of the self-concept because people practice retrieving
them together more often than statements phrased in terms of disagreement.
Because attitudes with which one agrees are likely a relatively stable, integrated
part of the self-concept, they may be harder to intentionally forget for several reasons.
First, people most likely have access to many self-relevant retrieval cues for information
that they agree with, and can access and reinstate these strong cues during retrieval
despite being given an instruction to forget. Second, if agree statements become easier to
integrate, then the presentation of one agree statement could remind people of other agree
statements. For example, when participants encounter a statement on List 2 with which
they agree, it could remind them of other agree statements from List 1 and eliminate the
directed forgetting costs. Research shows that when items across the two lists are related
to each other, they tend to remind participants of List 1 items they are trying to forget,
and this recursive reminding prevents directed forgetting (e.g., Conway et al., 2000;
Sahakyan & Goodmon, in press). In fact, it could be argued that presentation of disagree
information may also lead to reminding of already studied agree information as part of a
defensive, counter-argumentation process. Eagly et al. (2000) has described a process by
which participants react to counter attitudinal information by producing counter-
arguments in response to the information they disagree with. Therefore, a counter-
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argument, which is essentially an agree statement produced in reaction to a disagree
statement, may also serve to remind participants of other agree statements already studied
and reduce directed forgetting.
No significant benefits of directed forgetting were observed in either experiment.
According to the strategy change theory of directed forgetting benefits (Sahakyan &
Delaney, 2003), benefits may have failed to emerge because participants in the forget
condition were not more motivated to switch to a better encoding strategy on List 2
compared to participants in the remember condition. Sahakyan and Delaney (2003)
noted that participants who switched encoding strategies from List 1 to List 2 most often
switched from a shallow encoding strategy on List 1 to a deep encoding strategy on List
2. They proposed that this strategy change takes place more often in the forget group
than in the remember group because a forget cue serves to break up the study episode and
allows participants in the forget group to assess and realize the ineffectiveness of their
shallow List 1 strategy. This mid-list assessment makes participants in the forget group
more likely to switch strategies in attempts to improve List 2 encoding than participants
in the remember group, who are never presented with a clear opportunity to assess List 1
learning. However, in the current study, encoding was controlled because participants
were required to perform the same orienting task on both lists. Sahakyan and Delaney
(2003) demonstrated that requiring use of the same encoding strategy on both lists
eliminates benefits, because the opportunity to switch to a more efficient strategy on List
2 is prevented. Therefore, because encoding strategy was controlled in the current
studies, participants may not have recognized any opportunity to switch strategies
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between Lists 1 and 2. Additionally, even if participants did evaluate their encoding
strategy following List 1, because the orienting tasks engaged deep processing on List 1,
participants in both the remember and forget conditions likely did not perceive a strategy
shift between Lists 1 and 2 necessary to improve List 2 recall. Finally, while many
participants may be aware of different mnemonics that they can use to improve the
encoding of lists of words, such as making up a story, they may simply not know of any
strategies that they can use to improve the encoding of sentences. If this is the case, a
strategy change between lists would not be expected.
While there were no directed forgetting benefits observed in either experiment, in
both experiments Republicans showed anti-benefits on List 2 recall. However, unlike in
Experiment 1, where Republicans showed anti-benefits for incongruent statements, in
Experiment 2 they showed significant anti-benefits for congruent statement recall. We
had no a prior reason to expect anti-benefits, or that Republican and Democrats would
show different patterns of List 2 recall. While it is interesting that only Republicans
showed anti-benefits, because these anti-benefits were obtained for incongruent
statements in Experiment 1 and congruent statements in Experiment 2, there seems to be
no clear explanation for the effect that we can give at this time.
Implications for Theoretical Mechanisms of Directed Forgetting
As described in the introduction section, there are currently two classes of
theories of directed forgetting – single-process account, which explain the costs and the
benefits via a single mechanism, and dual-process theories, which explain the costs and
benefits with two separate mechanisms. In the current studies, costs of directed
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forgetting were observed in both experiments, however, no significant benefits were
observed in either experiment. The dissociation between the costs and the benefits is
problematic for single-process theories because they assume that these effects are
interdependent and that one cannot observe one effect of directed forgetting without the
other. Sahakyan and Delaney’s (2003, 2005) dual process account of directed forgetting
allows one to explain the emergence of costs but not benefits, without having to make
additional assumptions, because the costs and the benefits are attributed to two separate
mechanisms that do not always operate simultaneously.
While the dual-process account provides a better explanation for the absence of
benefits despite significant costs, the presence of costs could be explained using any one
of three popular directed forgetting mechanisms: selective rehearsal, retrieval inhibition,
or context change.
First, Bjork’s (1970, 1972) selective rehearsal theory posits that the costs of
directed forgetting arise because participants in the forget group terminate rehearsal of
List 1 items following a forget cue, and are consequently less able to recall those items
than participants in the remember group. The finding that both disagree and neutral
statements were forgotten is consistent with this theory; however, how this theory might
explain the lack of forgetting of agree statements is less clear. One could assume that the
deep encoding or strong retrieval cues associated with agree statements could compensate
for the lack of rehearsal of these items. However, if this were the case, one might also
have expected a lack of forgetting of disagree statements, as these statements were
actually recalled better in the remember condition in Experiment 2 than were agree
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statements. This finding implies that strong encoding and good retrieval cues were also
likely present for the disagree statements, and yet did not prohibit successful forgetting.
To account for the lack of forgetting of agree statements we would need to assume that
this type of information is insensitive to encoding factors. Future research is needed to
determine whether or not this is the case.
Bjork’s (1989) retrieval inhibition hypothesis attributes the costs of directed
forgetting to the inhibition or blocked access to List 1 items during retrieval in the forget
group. Once again, this account can easily explain the costs that were observed for
disagree and neutral statements. However, to explain the lack of costs for agree
statements, one must assume that participants were less able to inhibit agree statements
than disagree or neutral statements. It is possible that integration of agree statements may
have led to an inability to inhibit these items. Researchers in both the areas of directed
forgetting (Conway et al., 2000) and retrieval-induced forgetting (Anderson &
McCulloch, 1999) have argued that item integration can reduce or eliminate inhibitory
effects.
Finally, Sahakyan and Kelley’s (2002) context change account states that the
costs of directed forgetting arise because the presentation of a forget cue leads to a switch
in mental context between Lists 1 and 2; in following, List 1 forget group recall suffers
because the context present at the time of retrieval does not match that of List 1 encoding.
A context switch may have led to forgetting of neutral and disagree statements, as access
to the cues associated with these statements may have been lost following this context
change. It is also possible that because attitude information with which one agrees is
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likely a well-integrated part of the self-concept that the self-relevant cues associated with
agree information were easily reinstated following the context change, leading to a lack
of forgetting of these statements.
While the current results do not clearly distinguish what theory or combination of
theories best explains directed forgetting, the emergence of boundary conditions found in
the current study (such as agreement), are important because they continue to shape and
develop the theoretical understanding of this phenomenon. The current study revealed an
important role of agreement in directed forgetting of self-relevant attitude information.
However, further research needs to address the role of other factors such as personal
importance, knowledge level, and/or emotional reaction. These variables play an
important role in memory for attitudes ( e.g., Zajonc,1980; Holbrook, Berent, Krosnik,
Visser, & Boninger, 2005; Wiley, 2005) and might also mediate the directed forgetting
effect.
An important implication of the current study is that the presentation context in
which attitude information is framed can affect how forgettable that information
becomes. In the current study, simply changing the orienting task that participants were
required to perform during encoding affected the forgetting of congruent statements,
which were unforgettable when participants were required to rate statements for their
liberal/conservative phrasing, but were forgettable when participants were asked rate
them according to agreement/disagreement. The same kind of effect may take place in
more real-world situations. For example, it is possible that people may be less likely to
forget information they learned during a political debate if their own political party was
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made very salient during presentation of the information they agreed with. However,
people may be more able to forget unwanted information when it is presented in a context
that is framed strictly in terms of agreement/disagreement rather than political party
affiliation, such as in the case of an Independent candidate running for office for
example.
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